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SACRED SITE PROTECTION AGAINST A
BACKDROP OF RELIGIOUS
INTOLERANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of
persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man
has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for
use against those who dare to express or practice unorthodox religious beliefs.... [E]ven in this nation, conceived as it was in the

ideals of freedom, the right to practice religion in unconventional
ways is still far from secure.1
The history of Native American religious experience has been
riddled with intolerance, ignorance, and persecution. It is against this
backdrop that Native Americans continue to struggle for freedom of
religious expression and the protection of their sacred sites. For most
Native Americans, "[tlhe right to practice ...

native religions is the

right to be Indian."' 2 Native American religious expression does not
merely involve "going to church one day a week," but it is a culmina-3
tion of beliefs based upon nature and the universe in which they live.
Thus, the religious expression of Native Americans is impeded when
their sacred sites are not afforded the same protection as other religious institutions.
"Over forty-four Native American sacred sites ... are [currently]

threatened by tourism, development and resource exploitation."4
They are also threatened by New Age religious practitioners who appropriate Native American traditions and sacred places, often leaving
behind objects that are sacrilegious to the Native practitioner. 5 Increased development of public lands has wreaked havoc on the sacred
sites located within those areas, thus centering the controversy on the
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
2. Lawrence R. Baca, FederalIndian Law from Marshallto Marshall,41 FED. B. NEWS &

J. 543 (1994).
3. Barbara S. Falcone, Legal Protection (Or The Lack Thereof) of American Indian Sacred
Religious Sites, 41 FED. B. NEws & J. 568 (1994).

4. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994).
5. Michael Haederle, Spirited Away, Native American Rituals are Trendy. But is This

Homage or Another Rip-off. L.A. TIMEs, March 31, 1994, at El.
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struggle between the government's management of the public lands
and the religious practices of Native Americans. 6 Further, tourists
often stop to observe Native Americans practicing their traditional
ceremonies.7 Allowing continued public access causes. ceremonies to
lose much of their efficacy.
This comment focuses on the Native American religious experiences of the past, present, and future. Section II discusses the history
of intolerance that has been the backdrop for Native American religious practice since presumably this nation was conceived under the
auspices of religious liberty. Section HI deals with the statutory and
judicial history of Native American efforts to obtain religious liberty.
Finally, section IV discusses the efforts to achieve religious freedom
for Native Americans in the 103d and 104th Congresses, as well in the
future.
II.

NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION AND A
HISTORY OF INTOLERANCE

A.

Conflicting Views on What is Sacred

The Euro-American concept of what is sacred is vastly divergent
from the Native American concept. Traditionally, "amongst all native
people, the concepts of religion and culture are inextricably intertwined."' Native American religions are, of necessity and design, "as
diverse as the tribes and individuals who practice them." 9 The perceived homogeneity of Native American religion was conceived by
persons ignorant of the complexity of Native American peoples.
However, like diverse Christian beliefs, generalizations can be made
in respect to Native American beliefs.
Religious beliefs and practices for Native Americans are "part of
daily life: 'originally, sacred ways and practices were at the heart of
6. Jack F. Trope, ProtectingNative American Religious Freedom: The Legal, Historical,and
ConstitutionalBasis For The ProposedNative American Free Exercise of Religion Act, 20 REv.
LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 373, 374, 376 (1993). "Indian religions had suffered much at the hands
of the federal government, and some traditional practices continued to be under siege by representatives of governmental agencies." Robert S. Michaelsen, Law and the Limits of Liberty, in
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN REuGIous FREEDOM 116, 119 (Christopher Vecsey ed.,

1991).
7. Christopher Vecsey, Prologue,in HANDBOOK supra note 6, at 7, 22. Tourists often gawk
and yell at practioners at Rainbow Bridge, a sacred site for the Navajo. Id.
8. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1994).

9. Rebekah J. French, Free Exercise of Religion on the Public Lands, 11 PuB. LAND L.
REv. 197, 198 (1990); see also Vecsey, supra note 7, at 12.
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living and survival.""'1

As such, the coexistence of religion and cul-

ture is integral to Native American existence,' and includes the idea
that "all things in the world are dependent upon each other" and must
work in balance to create world order. 2
"For many Native Americans, sacred sites on public lands are
holy places of worship, their equivalent of churches, temples or synagogues."' 3 These sites are sacred because of their relation to the Native American concepts of sacred time' 4 and creation.', "Many of
these 'sacred sites' are found on public lands."' 6 These places are,
unlike churches and synagogues, "believed to have spiritual power in
and of themselves.'

7

If the site is desecrated in such a way as to

diminish its power, it is lost forever.' Currently, there are literally
hundreds of sacred sites in the Northwest alone, 19 not to mention the
thousands of others across the country. Quantification of sacred sites
is difficult since many Native American religious beliefs are tied to
maintaining secrecy of these sites.2"
All religions utilize holy places. However, Native American sacred sites have not been afforded the same protection as their counterparts because most Euro-Americans do not view them as
conventional places of worship. Native American holy places are
threatened by the government's history of assimilationist policy, the
10. French, supra note 9, at 198 (quoting PEGGY BECK & A.L. WALTERS, THE SACRED 4
(1980)).
11. Id.;
see also Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protectionof American Indian Sacred Geography, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 102-03; Robert S.Michealson, The Law and the Limits of Liberty,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 116, 127.
12. French, supra note 9, at 198; (quoting P. Beck & A.L. Walters, THm SACRED 4 (1980));
Falcone, supra note 3, at 569.
13. S.REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994).
14. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE, THE NATURE OF RELIGION 37-39
(1959); see also French, supra note 9, at 198; Falcone, supranote 3, at 569; Walker, supra note 11,
at 104.
15. EUADE, supra note 14, at 110. Under the Native American concept of creation, ceremonies often must take place at a site which the particular tribe considers to be the center of its
world. Id.; see also Falcone, supra note 3, at 569; Trope, supra note 6, at 376.
16. French, supra note 9, at 199.
17. Falcone, supranote 3, at 568. These sites may be considered holy to the Native American for numerous other reasons. They can be the dwelling places of spirits, the source of healing
water and herbs, or places to make pilgrimages and vision quests. Id. at 569.
18. Id.at 569. If that site is "destroyed or altered in such a way as to diminish its power, so
see also Walker, supra note
too is the ability to practice that particular site-specific religion." Id.;
11, at 110.
19. Walker,supra note 11, at 108.
20. Haederle, supra note 5, at El. Additionally, the cultural and religious tenets among
some tribes "mandate secrecy and prohibit disclosure of information concerning their sacred
sites, beliefs, and practices". S. REP.No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1994).
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failure to understand religious beliefs, Western concepts of resource
development, private property interests, and competing land use.21
B.

Colonialism/ Removal / Missionaries and Their Effect on Native
American Religion

The threat to Native American religious expression grew with our
nation. "The ever increasing occupation of Indian land, coupled with
military and political capability to separate the Indians from that land,
led to eventual prohibitions on free exercise of religion by Native
Americans."' The governmental obstacles to Native American religious ceremonies were numerous, ranging from promoting abandonment to complete prohibition.23 One thing is clear, as European
colonists arrived in the New World the lives of native peoples were
drastically altered.
During the early phases of colonization, the Indian policy set by
the British Crown dealt with indigenous populations as compromising
sovereign entities.' However, missionary workers did make "attempts to indoctrinate the native populations in the ways of Christianity."' These attempts were generally futile, as "the Indian nations
still controll[ed] their traditional land base... [and retained] access to
sacred sites."'26 However, the attempts were founded on the colonialist view, as stated in the Federalist Papers, that "[p]rovidence has been
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people - a
21. Falcone, supra note 3, at 569; see also Trope, supra note 6, at 376. Settlers and the
federal government have throughout history ascribed their own concepts of religion to the cultural and religious practices of Native Americans. This is true although the Supreme Court recognized a potentially unlimited range of religious beliefs, no matter how "incredible" or
"preposterous". U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,87 (1944); Columbus, on his "first day in this Hemisphere," recorded in his diary that "the Native people should easily be made Christians, because
it seems to me they have no religion." Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Speech at the Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (Apr. 6-7, 1995) (outline available from author). See generally
French, supra note 9, at 199.
22. Falcone, supra note 3, at 569. As European colonists arrived in the New World, the
lives of the native inhabitants were forever altered. The pervading sentiment from the colonists
was their superiority of civilization. The attempts to civilize the savages ranged from missionary
work, educational programs, and the introduction of culture, clothes, diet, and lifestyles. ROB.
ERT A. DIVINE,Er AL., AMERICA PAST AND PRESENr. VOLUME ONE TO 1877, 6-7 (2d ed. 1987).
23. Falcone, supra note 3, at 569.
24. Id.The treatment of the New World and its inhabitants by the Crown seems strikingly
similar to the sentiments of England toward Ireland in the mid 1500s. Colonization was seen as
a logical continuation of the Elizabethan conquest. DIVINE, supra note 22, at 6-7.
25. Falcone, supra note 3, at 569.
26. ld.
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people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion,... each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges and protection."27
The continued expansion of the non-Indian population enabled
acceptance of removal policies in Washington.2" During this period
the tribes lost not only their traditional land base, which held their
sacred sites, but also thousands of their people.29 The survivors' "ability to engage in site specific religion was significantly impaired" as a
result of losing their homelands.30
Their darkest hour was, however, yet to come. The reservation
period had "[t]he most devastating effects" on religious freedom.3 '
Reservations not only limited the Native Americans to a small area,
but generally removed them from their ancestral homelands. 32 Separating the Native Americans from their ancestral homes was not
enough, and a policy of assimilation began to attain new intensity.33
During this period, "for more than a century," missionary organizations were "provided [with] direct and indirect support" in their efforts to Christianize the Native Americans.34 Money and government
cooperation were given to missionaries, among others, for the purpose
'35
of introducing the Indians to the "habits and arts of civilization.
The aid greatly reinforced the federal assimilation policy. Efforts
ranged from forced measures to more insidious forms of indoctrination into European culture.
27. THE FEDERALIsT No. 2, 38-39 (John Jay) (Penguin ed., 1961) (emphasis added). It is
this thinking that led to the federal policy of dealing with Native American religious beliefs by
funding christianizing efforts, authorizing the military and courts to incarcerate, starve and murder native peoples, and forcibly removing children from their homes and cultures to government
and denominational schools. S.REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994). "Settlors who
possessed no knowledge of germ theory speculated that God had providentially cleared the wilderness of heathens." Dwvnm, supra note 22, at 10. It is estimated that 90-95% losses were not
uncommon for some tribes within the first century of contact with the Europeans. Of those that
survived, the Europeans encountered a people "sick and dispirited ...whose lives had been
shattered," reinforcing the divine providence theory. Id.
28. Falcone, supra note 3, at 569. The removal period lasted from approximately 1820 to
1860. As originally conceived by Jefferson, removal would allow the Indians to remain behind
provided they were "civilized." However, it soon became clear that the settlers would accept no
less than the removal of all Indians. FELIx S.COHEN's, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW

240 (1986 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN's].
29. Falcone, supra note 3, at 570.
30. Id.
31. The reservation policy continued from approximately 1860 through the 1880s. Id.
32. WILLAM CANBY, JR., AMERiCAN INDIAN LAW IN A NuTsi-IELL 17 (1981).
33. Id. at 18. This policy of forced assimilation began in the 1880s and continued through
the mid 19th century. Id.
34. Trope, supra note 6, at 374.
35. COHEN'S, supra note 28, at 240.
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An integral part of the assimilation policy was the "replacement
of traditional religions with Christianity."36 Native Americans were
quickly targeted for assimilation into the civilized culture. The federal
government hired missionaries as federal Indian agents, and Indian
lands were regularly given to church denominations by the federal
government. 37 The cooperation between the church and government
in efforts to civilize the "savages" was extensive.
Eventually, the effort to Christianize Native Americans led to
statutory bans on traditional religious practices.38 The prohibitions
were not only on religious and cultural practices.39 The regulations of
these practices were codified in 1883 under the Code of Indian Offenses.4" The Code was promulgated under the direction of then Secretary of Interior Henry Teller. Teller's direction led to the banning of
the Sundance, the Potlatch, and other practices. 4 1 The codes and
courts were, by design, used to destroy Native American institutions,
not merely to promote order.42
Destruction is exactly what this policy accomplished. Pursuant to
Teller's policy, federal soldiers attempting to suppress the Ghost
Dance43 massacred 390 Sioux men, women and children at Wounded
Knee in 1890. 44 Even "into the 1920s, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
36. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1994). This policy went as far as to promote
"the separation of young Indian children from their parents and traditional culture through the
federal boarding school system." Id. at 2.
37. Walter Echo-Hawk, Loopholes in Religious Liberty: The Need ForA Federal Law To
ProtectWorship ForNative People, 16 NARF LEGAL REV. 7 (1991). The government went as far
as to use federal funds to establish a church on a Sioux reservation. This action was later upheld
against a legal challenge. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
38. Falcone, supra note 3, at 570.
39. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994).
40. Cohen's, supranote 28, at 141. The primary purpose of this code, was not only to penalize criminal offenses, but to "criminalize native culture, religious practices, and ceremonials."
ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 145 (3d ed. 1983).

41. Falcone, supra note 3, at 576. The Sundance is of vital importance to the Plains Indians,
in particular the Oglala Sioux. Id. at 546 n.47. The Potlatch is a feast and give-away ceremony
which is vital to the Northwest Coast Indians. Id. at n.48.
42. Falcone, supra note 3, at 570.
43. Sharon O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Religious Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK, supranote 6, at 27, 28. The Ghost Dance is a series of religious doctrines that originated
between 1869 and 1872. The belief was that the "dead would return, and that the end of the
world was near." PEGGY BECK & A.L. WALTERS, Tim SACRED 170 (1980). The end of the

world meant the elimination of all white people. Id.
44. For this act, Congress awarded the soldiers in the Seventh Calvary, the former unit of
General Armstrong Custer, the Congressional Medal of Honor. BECK & WALTERS, supra note
43, at 170; see also Bo Emerson, Popularity of Native American Lore Raises Questions of Exploitation, ATL. CONST., Oct. 4, 1991 at D1.
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(BIA) prohibited Native Americans from participating in [their tradi' The policy of aggressive prohibition of Native
tional] ceremon[ies]." 45
46
American religion and culture was continued until the 1930s.
C. 1933 - A Flicker of Hope
In 1933, the Native Americans saw their first flicker of hope when
John Collier was appointed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.47 Mr.
Collier, a former social worker and a student of Indian culture and
spirituality, ceased "official prohibitions against Indian religious practices."' 48 However, not until 1934 did the "federal government fully
recogniz[e] the right to free religious worship on Indian
reservations."4 9
Even after government prohibitions were lifted, intolerances continued for Native Americans. The shift in policy "did little to overcome the nation's general ignorance of and prejudices against Indian
religions." 50 These factors, along with the so called "settlers" continued the hardship on Native American religious practice. 51
The twentieth century found little more tolerance for the free exercise of Native American religion. The population continued to expand, and the problems occurring in tandem with that expansion
further burdened Native American sacred sites. 52 "[I]mpeded by timber harvesting, mining, tourism, and other encroachments," the sacred
sites were often altered from their original physical condition.53 Competing developments increased the burden on federal agencies that
administer these lands; increased bureaucracy and restrictions was the
typical agency response.5' 4
45. French, supra note 9, at 199; see also C. EASTMAN, THE SOUL OF THE INDIAN, FEDERAL
AGENCIES TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDLAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACr REPORT 1 (1987).

46. Trope, supra note 6, at 374.
47. O'Brien, supra note 43, at 28; see also Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
48. O'Brien, supra note 43, at 28. John Collier "viewed native institutions as strong, positive influences that needed to be preserved and encouraged." Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
49. Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
50. O'Brien, supra note 43, at 28. The Christian community's efforts at converting the Native Americans also continued. Id at 28.
51. Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
52. Id. The problems that were faced were a direct result of the increasing industrialization
of the non-Indian population. As the cities became more populated, "travel and tourism...
became more attractive" to those who lived there. Id. As a consequence, sacred sites that were
previously ignored or isolated from non-Indian intrusion became meccas. Id
53. 1d.; see also Vincent Deloria, Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom, 16 NARF LEGAL
REv. 1-2 (1991).
54. Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
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III. PRIOR LAWS AFFECTING NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

A.

American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978

To alleviate the burdens placed on Native American religious
practice, lobbying efforts ensued. In 1978, formal recognition was

given to First Amendment protection of Native American religious

practices. 55 That year, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("the Act").5 6 The stated policy of the Act is to

"protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right to
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions...

including but not limited to access to sacred sites, use and possession
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and
' 57
traditional rights.
The Act passed as a result of Congressional findings that no
"clear, comprehensive, and consistent federal policy" can be found
with respect to Native American religious freedom.5 8 Further, Congress found that a "lack of knowledge or the insensitive and inflexible
enforcement of federal policies" led to religious infringements.5 9
President Carter signed into law this "first step by the federal govern-

ment toward acknowledging" the government's role in promoting religious intolerance toward Native Americans. 60 The Act recognized the
integral role that religious practice plays in Native American culture. 61
While the Act was a breath of hope, it was not without problems.
The first undertaking of the Act delineates policy goals, yet fails to
"set forth any standards for what would be considered a violation."62
Additionally, it fails to determine the exact duties placed upon the
federal government. Finally, the courts have narrowly interpreted the
Act, holding it is a mere policy statement having "no teeth. ' 63 Thus,
55. French, supra note 9, at 200.
56. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
57. Id. Legislative history supports the proposition that the Act contemplates public land
regulatory agencies to make decisions in compliance with the provisions of the Act. Wilson v.
Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
58. H.RJ. REs. 738, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (enacted).
59. Id.
60. Falcone, supra note 3, at 571.
61. Id. at 572.
62. Id.
63. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).
Rep. Morris Udall, the bills primary sponsor, had a great deal to do with this conclusion. To
insure the passage of the bill he characterized the bill as only a statement of policy. His comments were meant to convince opponents that Native Americans were in no way being elevated
above others. 124 CONo. REc. 21,444-45 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).
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the Act has been determined to give "no cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights."' 64
The second undertaking of the Act required that the President
command the federal agencies make regulations and policies more
sensitive to Native American religious expression. 65 A task force, set
up by President Carter, was to comply with this part of the Act.6 6
"The task force requested all federal agencies to evaluate their policies and procedures in light of the act and conducted ten on-site hearings."67 The report presented to Congress "contain[ed] thirty-seven
pages of recommendations for specific changes. ' 68 The report, however, has not led to great change on the part of agencies in their attitudes toward Native American religious freedom.
B.

The FirstAmendment, Lyng & Smith

1. The First Amendment
Since 1978, when the Act was passed, the courts have had ample
opportunity to consider the "rights of Native Americans engag[ing] in
traditional religious practices. '69 As the Act does not afford Native
American religious practioners judicial relief, appeals to the Court
were presented on the basis of the First Amendment.7 °
In the early 1980s, Native Americans who sought to prevent the
disturbance or destruction of sacred sites were unsuccessful in the federal courts. 7 ' The courts failed to protect Native American traditional
practitioners. 72 Prior to 1988, a balancing test was applied to determine if a plaintiff's free exercise rights had been violated.7 3 This two-

part test was used by federal courts as the standard for determining
violations of free exercise rights since the Supreme Court's holding in
64. Falcone, supra note 3, at 572.
65. PUB. L. No. 95-341 § 2, 94 Stat. 469, 470 (1978).
66. O'Brien, supra note 43, at 30. The "task force was composed of nine federal agencies
and [was] supported by representatives of American Indian Rights Fund and American
Indian Law Center." Id.
67. Id.
68. Falcone, supra note 3, at 572.
69. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994).
70. Falcone, supra note 3, at 573.
71. Crow v. Gullett, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,452 U.S. 954 (1981); Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983) and 464 U.S. 1056 (1984); Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
72. Trope, supra note 6, at 375.
73. Falcone, supra note 3, at 573. The Supreme Court's decision in Lyng dealt a "serious
blow" to the Sherbert test. Id.
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Sherbert v. Verner.7 4 In the area of sacred sites, the courts added an

additional element. The practitioners were required to show that the
practice affected was "central or indispensable to their religions." 75
With the additional requirement added to the Sherbert test, Native American religious practitioners faced significant difficulty in protecting their sacred sites.76 The early failures are integral to the
development of a First Amendment analysis of Native American religious freedom.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,77 the proposed gov-

ernment action was the flooding of the ancient Cherokee village of
Chota with the construction of the Tellico Dam in Tennessee. 78 The
site is believed to be the birthplace of the Cherokee people.79 If the
area were flooded, the Cherokees believed their ability to pass on
spiritual beliefs and knowledge would be destroyed." The Sixth Circuit rejected their claim holding that the Cherokees had failed to show
that the area was "central" to their religious practices.8 '
Circumstances were no better for Native Americans in the Tenth
Circuit. In Badoni v. HigginsonF the issue once again was the building of a dam. The site at issue was "Rainbow Bridge, a nearby spring,
prayer spot and cave that held positions of central importance" to the
Navajo practitioner. 83 Additionally, the Navajos believe that Rainbow Bridge is the incarnate form of Navajo gods. 4 The National Park
Service provided public access to this area after the site was flooded.85
The court held that the government's interest in maintaining the lake
level was more important than the burden on religious practice. 6
In Crow v. Gullett,87 the Eighth Circuit was no more favorable to
the Native American practitioner. Bear Butte was the sacred site at
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This balancing test had two parts. First, the plaintiff had to prove
that the government action prohibits her from engaging in a practice based on sincere religious
beliefs. Once this is shown, the burden of proof rests on the government to show a legitimate
state interest for its action and means that are "narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Falcone, supra note 3, at 573.
75. Trope, supra note 6, at 377.
76. Id.
77. 620 F.2d 1159, 1160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
78. Id.at 1160.

79. Id at 1163.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1162-63.
Id. at 1164.
638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
Id. at 177.

84. Id.
85. Id. The park service also allowed concessionaires to sell alcohol at the site. Id. at 178.
86. Id. at 178.

87. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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issue in this case. The State of South Dakota had undertaken construction of viewing platforms, parking lots, trails and roads at Bear
Butte in the Black Hills.88 This site is sacred to the Lakota and Tsistsistas peoples.8 9
The Eighth Circuit held the state interests in preserving the environment and improving public access to the park outweighed the religious interests of the Native Americans. 90 The court affirmed the
district court holding; to prevail the plaintiffs would have to show "the
coercive effect of the [restriction] as it operates against the practice of
their religion." 91 Once again the free exercise of religion by Native
Americans fell victim to the courts' interpretation of the First
Amendment.
2. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation
In 1985, a dim ray of hope emerged in the Ninth Circuit when the
court decided Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation v. Peterson.92

However, this hope died quickly as the United States

Supreme Court reversed Peterson with the decision in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation.9 3

The issue in Lyng, was whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment can forbid government actions that would impact
sacred sites. 94 In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit found the sacred site was

a central and indispensable part of the Native Americans' religious
practice 95 and held that the proposed road and timber harvesting was
in violation of the First Amendment. 96 The court enjoined the completion of the road as well as the timber harvesting.97
88. Id. at 857.
89. Id. Bear Butte is a frequent site of vision quests practiced by the Lakota people. Vision
quests require privacy and quiet.
90. Id. at 859.
91. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 790 (D.S.D. 1982), aff d, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963)).
92. 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on reh'g,795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
93. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). For a complete discussion of the decision see Kathryn C. Wyatt,
The Supreme Cour4 Lyng and the Lone Wolf Principle, 65 Cm.-KENr L. REv. 623 (1989).
94. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Specifically, the government action involved in this case was
the construction of a road and harvesting timber on land which is considered sacred by the
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians. Id.; see Falcone, supra note 3, at 573.
95. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F.Supp. 586, 594 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), aff d 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), affd on reh'g 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd
sub. nom. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
96. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 56 F. Supp. at 597.
97. Id. at 606.
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In the Ninth Circuit's de novo review of the plaintiffs' First
Amendment claim, the court used the two-part test from Sherbert.98
After reviewing the district court findings, the Ninth Circuit held that
the first part of the test had been satisfied since the construction
would burden the Native Americans' free exercise rights. 99
The court then proceeded to analyze the second part of the test,
namely whether the government had met its burden of proving a compelling state interest. 10 Ruling that the government had failed to do
so, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court injunction, finally recognizing the free exercise rights of Native Americans. 1° 1
However, this victory would be short lived as the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n. 02
The following year, the ray of hope for Native American religious
freedom was 3gone as the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
0
1986 ruling.'
In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Court articulated its rejection
of the traditional balancing test with regard to the government's land
management decisions. 104 The Court held that the government action
must coerce individuals to act contrary to their religious beliefs or penalize religious activity by a denial of equal protection. 0 5 Absent
such a showing, the Court held that "the First Amendment provided
no protection against governmental action, regardless of the impact
upon Native American religious practitioners."'10 6 Thus the Court
held that the First Amendment does not "divest the Government of
its right to use what is, after all, its land."' 07
The Court went on to state that the Forest Service was in conformance with the Act.'08 The Court clearly expressed, however, that
the Act does not confer any cause of action or judicially enforceable
98. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
99. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Lying v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
100. Richard M. Carson, The Free Exercise of Native American Religions on Public Lands:
The Development Of and Outlook for Protection Under The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, 11 PuB. LAND L. REv. 181, 188 (1990).

101. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 698. The court found that any relief granted to the Native Americans would be an accommodation, not establishment, of their beliefs. Id. at 694.
102. 481 U.S. 1036 (1987).
103. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
104. Trope, supra note 6, at 380.
105. Id.; Carson, supra note 100, at 189.
106. Trope, supra note 6, at 380.
107. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
108. Carson, supra note 100, at 189.
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rights. 10 9 As mentioned earlier, the Court relied on the statements in
the Congressional
Record which found that the Act had "no teeth in
0
it."11
The Court's decision concluded by discrediting the centrality test
proposed by dissenting Justices."' That test involved a determination
of those lands that are "central" to religious groups and whether governmental land management decisions would destroy that group's belief. 1 2 The majority decided the test might require the Court to find
certain "beliefs are not central to certain religions, thus ruling that
11 3
some religious claimants misunderstood their own beliefs."
14
Nevertheless, all was not lost for the High Country in Lyng.
The site tribes sought to protect was saved on October 28, 1990. 15
However, irreparable harm had already been done to the First
Amendment, as Lyng had further lessened the standard required to
show a compelling state interest. The real damage was yet to come." 6
3.

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.

Smith
In Smith," 7 the Court did more than simply chisel away at traditional First Amendment jurisprudence; it took a sledgehammer to
it.118 Smith considered whether the First Amendment required states
to exempt sacramental use of peyote" 9 from their criminal laws. Prior
to the 1990 Smith decision, several state courts had held that the First
Amendment protected the sacramental use of peyote. 20 However, in
109. Id.; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
110. 124 CONG. REc 21,443, 21,445 (daily ed. July 18, 1978)(statement of Rep. Udall).
111. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58.
112. Id. at 474 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Carson, supra note 100, at 190.
114. 485 U.S. at 439.
115. Falcone, supra note 3, at 573. Congress passed a law that added the High Country to
the Siskiyou Wilderness, thus prohibiting the logging road. However, this was not a recognition
of the religious freedom of Native Americans, but was due to the area's wilderness status. Id.
116. Id.
117. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
118. See Falcone, supra note 3, at 573.
119. Peyote is "a species of cacti that possesses psychedelic powers. Native American religious use of peyote ... within the United States was well established in the nineteenth century."
Trope, supra note 6, at 380.
120. Trope, supranote 6, at 381. See People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964); Whitehorn
v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) (holding the First Amendment protects the transportation and possession of peyote); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the use of peyote in a bona fide pursuit of religious faith is protected by the Free
Exercise Clause), rev. denied, 517 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
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1990, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not require 1states to exempt sacramental use of peyote from criminal
12
laws.
The respondents in Smith were members of the Native American
Church whose religious practices include ingesting peyote as a sacrament."2 Alfred Smith and his co-worker were fired from their positions with a private employer because they admitted to ingesting
peyote as a part of their religious practice.123 The respondents' subsequent applications for unemployment benefits were rejected by the
state of Oregon. 24 The respondents then argued that the criminal
code violated the First Amendment because it prohibits the free exercise of religion. 25 The Supreme Court refused to grant the respondents request to apply the traditional Sherbert balancing test. 26 To
justify this, the Court expanded on its holding in Lyng, finding that
"incidental burdens to religion derived from laws of general application were constitutionally permissible."' 12 7 Thus, the Court sent an
even stronger statement that the First Amendment is no longer a
method by which Native American practitioners can prevent the gov128
ernment from interfering with the practice of their religious beliefs.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that a simple infringement upon the free exercise of religion was no longer enough to make
a neutral law unconstitutional. 29 Justice Scalia went on to say that a
law must violate both freedom of religion and other constitutionally
based rights to be deemed unconstitutional. 30 This holding not131only
limited, but completely abandoned the Sherbert balancing test.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's
complete rejection of the balancing test.' 32 However, it was her opinion in Lyng that paved the way for the Smith decision. In fact, Justice
Scalia specifically cited Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lyng to support
121. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.

122. Id.at 874.
123. Id.

124. Id. The state denied these benefits because the respondents had violated the Oregon
Criminal Code with respect to use of controlled substances. Id. at 875.
125. Id. at 876.
126. Id. at 876. The Sherbert test had been consistently used since it was first declared in
1963. French, supra note 9, at 208.
127. Falcone, supra note 3, at 573 (quoting Employment Division Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
128. S.REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994).
129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 878-82.
132. Id. at 891-903.
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his argument that the traditional balancing test does not apply to challenges to criminal laws under the Free Exercise Clause. 33 Justice
O'Connor argued to limit rejection of the balancing test to cases
which would "require the government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways
that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
1 34
citizens."'

Regardless of this seeming change of heart by Justice O'Connor,
the Court's refusal to apply the Sherbert test sent shock waves
throughout religious communities everywhere. 3 5 In Smith, the
Supreme Court took religious freedom out from under the umbrella
of First Amendment protection and thrust it into the middle of the
political arena. 36
Therefore, religious practitioners must become active in the legislative process to find protection from generally applicable laws that
burden their religion. 3 7 While the ruling in Smith impacts all religious practitioners, it primarily affects Native Americans. 138 The very
nature of the political process mandates that those groups in the majority garner more respect in the society. 1 39 Along with respect,
comes power to affect the majority's religious goals. 140 Nevertheless,
all groups were concerned with the potential impact of Smith on religious practice. 14 '
133. Id. at 883-85. The Court noted that it had never used this test to invalidate a criminal
law. Id. As Justice Scalia stated, "[i]t is hard to see any reason why the government should have
to tailor its health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not
have to tailor its management of public lands." Id. at 885 n.2.
134. Id. at 900 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,699 (1986)).
See Trope, supranote 6, at 382-83. Moreover, the hardship that the Court was placing on minority religions was noted by Justice O'Connor when she stated that, "to protect the rights of those
whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility" is
precisely why the First Amendment was enacted. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902.
135. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994). Given the ruling and standards set forth
in Smith, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which a law could rise to the level of a
First Amendment violation. Falcone, supra note 3, at 573.
136. Luralene D. Tapahe, After The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal Protection for FirstAmerican Worshipers, 24 N.M. L. REv. 331, 343 (1994).
137. See Id.
138. Id. at 344.
139. Id. at 343. The ruling in Smith ignores the framers' of the Constitution fears that the
"tyranny of the majority would silence minority religion, speech and other civil rights unless
removed from the political arena and given special protection." Smith, 494 U.S. at 902-903
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Tapahe, supra note 136, at 343.
141. Id. at 344. The overriding concern was evident in the broad number of groups participating in the call for legislative reform. Smith created a crisis for all Americans in terms of
religion when the Court abandoned the Sherbert test. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1994). The decision "fundamentally altered the basic nature of American religious liberty from
a constitutional right protected by the courts to a statutory right dependent upon the goodwill of
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C. RFRA 1993 - Inroads Toward Freedom of Religious Practice
As a result of this concern and activity, the legislature enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in 1993.42 While the

law cooled the controversy and crisis created by the Smith decision, it
did very little to protect Native American practitioners.143 RFRA restores the compelling state interest test as the applicable standard in
free exercise cases. 14' Further RFRA restores the First Amendment
analyses of Wisconsin v. Yoder 45 and Sherbert v. Verner.146 Although
RFRA does not set a mandatory standard of review to be used in First
Amendment cases, it does construct a "statutory prohibition against
government action that substantially burdens religious free
exercise."' 147
Unlike AIRFA, RFRA § 3 (c) provides judicial relief to individuals whose free exercise rights have been burdened in violation of the
Act. 48 However, while RFRA substantially advances the protection
of free exercise rights, it does not remedy the issue of Native American sacred site protection. 149 The Court's holding in Lyng, which
stated internal governmental affairs never constitute a burden on free
exercise rights, 5 0 coupled with RFRA's legislative history, effectively
left sacred sites outside of the protection of RFRA.' 51 Additionally,
protection may remain lacking because of pre-Smith misconceptions
about Native American sacred sites and religions. 5 2 The legislative
history of RFRA will undoubtedly mean business as usual for courts
handling Native American claims. 53 Given the history of application
lawmakers and the outcome of votes." Echo-Hawk, supra note 21 at 175. Efforts to circumvent
Smith, led to H.R. 272, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

142. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1993).
143. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1988, §2000bb(b)(1) (1993).

145. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
146. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also Tapahe, supra note 136, at 345.

147. Falcone, supra note 3, at 574. Any government action substantially burdening the free
exercise of religion is prohibited unless it involves a compelling state interest and employs the
least restrictive means to achieve its purpose. Id.
148. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, § 2000bb-1 (1993). The relief may be used as a claim or a
defense.
149. Falcone, supra note 3, at 574.
150. Id.

151. Id. The legislative history of RFRA makes it explicitly clear that the compelling state
interest test would not apply to Native Americans exercising their traditional practices at sacred
sites on public lands. S. REp. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994); see also Echo-Hawk, supra
note 21, at 179-180.
152. Tapahe, supra note 136, at 345-47.
153. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). According to the Judiciary Committee,
the expectation is that the courts will continue to look to free exercise cases that occurred prior
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in the courts, it is possible that no Native American religious activity,
particularly at sacred sites
on public lands, will ever be found to be
15 4
substantially burdened.
Unfortunately, considerable room for judicial insensitivity and
cultural bias still exist under a RFRA claim. When dealing with sacred site protection, Native American religious freedom is still at a
crisis point. Thus, there is still a need for legislation to protect Native
American religious freedom.
IV.

A.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR PROTECTION

OriginalProposal - Native American Free Exercise of Religion
Act 1993 - Senate Bill 1021
In response to these continued concerns, the Committee on In-

dian Affairs developed legislation to protect Native American "spirituality and religious ceremonies and practices."' 55 The work of the
Coalition and the Senate Committee culminated in the first comprehensive legislation to be introduced regarding Native American religious freedom. Senate Bill 1021 ("S. 1021"), the "Native American
Free Exercise of Religion Act," was introduced by Senator Inouye on
May 23, 1993.156 The introduction was followed by a process of dialogue with federal agencies. 57
The dialogue process began in June of 1993 with an effort to assure a workable framework for protecting those Native American sacred sites located on public land and the practices associated with
them. 58 For the next year the process continued with meetings, the
purpose of which was to identify issues and areas of concern relating
to Smith to determine whether Native American free exercise has been burdened and if the least
restrictive means have been used to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The bill
was
not meant to be a codification of prior decisions, but a restoration of the legal standards that
were applied there. Id.
154. Tapahe, supranote 136, at 346-47. Since under RFRA, strict scrutiny will only be used
if a burden is found, the result for Native American free exercise claims is likely to be the same
as always: no protection. Id.at 347.
155. S.REP. No. 411,103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994). This work was done in conjunction with
the American Indian Religious Freedom Coalition. This coalition, formed in 1990-92, was
founded by the National Congress of American Indians, the Native American Rights Fund, and
the Association on American Indian Affairs. The Coalition designated federal legislation concerning protection of Native American religious freedom as its number one goal for the 103d
Congress. Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 178.
156. S.1021, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
157. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994).
158. Id. The framework was intended to be workable from the agency vantage point to insure willingness of agency representatives to work with the Coalition and Committee to assure
the bill provisions would work within their other statutory responsibilities. Id.
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to S. 1021, between the Coalition and the Administration.15 9 The
main focus of these meetings was Title I, the sacred sites provision of
S. 1021.160
S. 1021 was an omnibus bill that would: (1) Grant procedural and
substantive protection, including a cause of action, to protect sacred
sites from adverse federal actions (Title I);161 (2) Overrule the holding
in Smith with regard to peyote (Title II);162 (3) Address the equal protection rights of Native American prisoners, in the process it would
overturn O'Lone v. Shabazz, 63 a Supreme Court case that had already dealt with these issues. (Title IlI);' 64 (4) Increase access to eagle
feathers and other sacred objects (Title IV);165 and (5) Establish a private cause of action, similar to RFRA, that would protect all expres166
sions of Native American religion (Title V).
The proposed Act would provide a "comprehensive and detailed
response" and enumerate notice and comment procedures and would
provide an enforceable cause of action with penalties. 167 Passage of
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 139 CONG. REC S6458 (May 23, 1993); Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 181. In TrrTLE I,
Congress found that the "Federal government has the obligation to enact enforceable Federal
policies which will protect Native American communit[ies]" culture and which will not "interfere
with free exercise of Native American religions." Id. Additionally, the record shows that Congress "has never enacted a judicially enforceable law comparably restricting agency discretion
for the sake of the site-specific requirements associated with the free exercise of Native American religions." Id.
162. Id. at S6461. The Congressional findings with respect to peyote were that since 1965 the
sacramental use of peyote has been exempted from Federal laws governing controlled substances. Id Further, even though several states had followed the federal governments lead,
there is a lack of uniformity. Id. The Congress found that because of the trust responsibility,
there was a duty to prohibit discrimination against Indians by reason of their religious beliefs
and practices. Id.
163. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
164. 139 CONG. REc.S6461 (May 23, 1993). In general, Congress found that Native American prisoners who practice Native American religions should have the same access as is afforded
Judeo-Christian prisoners. Id. This provision includes physical characteristics of the prisoner,
such as wearing their hair in a certain manner, as well as access to Native American religious
facilities such as sweat lodges, teepees and other locations to facilitate Native American religious
ceremonies. Id.
165. Id. The provision includes consultation with Fish and Wildlife Service to provide access
to bald and golden eagles, their feathers, or any other parts, nests, etc., needed to facilitate
Native American religious practice. Id. The provision also references the need for consultation
regarding other animals and plants that might fall under the regulation of federal agencies, yet
are integral to Native American religious practices. Id. at S6462.
166. Id. at S6462. This cause of action would apply the compelling state interest test and
places the burden on Native American practitioners to prove, by a showing of any evidence, that
the restriction is a result of Federal or State action. Id. Additionally, attorney's fees will be
awarded to the prevailing party. Id.
167. Falcone, supra note 3, at 575.
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this bill would "substantially redress the currently inadequate protection of Native American sacred religious sites."' 68 A great deal of
discussion resulted from the conflicting interests implicated under the
bill's provisions. 69
The hearings and dialogue on S. 1021 centered on the constitutional issues raised by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 17 0 The key
issue the DOJ was concerned with was whether Title I of the bill violated the Establishment Clause. 17 1 In particular, the DOJ was concerned with the potential for "impermissible entangl[ing] the
Government with religion," in the notice and consultation sections.' 7 2
As a result of these concerns, the bill was refined and Senator Inouye
introduced S. 2269.173

B. A Revised Proposal- Native American CulturalProtectionand
Free Exercise of Religion Act 1994 - S. 2269
S. 2269 was introduced as a result of the year-long negotiations to
refine S. 10 2 1 .171 S. 2269 was introduced as a new measure which reflected a refinement of the provisions of S. 1021 as well as the results
of consultation with the Administration. 17 The bill clarified some of
S. 1021's provisions but for the most part failed to respond to the concerns voiced by the DOJ with regard to sacred site protection. 76 S.
168. Id.
169. These interests include those concerning federal land management and development of
the public lands. Additionally, state land management agencies, mining, logging and other development interests are potentially impacted.
170. Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 181.
171. Id. at 181-182. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional issues of this bill see
Trope, supra note 6, at 388-403. It is interesting to note that the Department of Justice did not
take great issue with the peyote, prisoner, or eagle provisions, but rather focused concern on the
sacred site provision. Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 182.
172. Id. These provisions would grant Native American religious leaders the power to "temporarily halt" federal action in violation of the Establishment Clause ruling in Larking v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Echo-Hawk, supranote 21, at 182. Additionally, the DOJ was
concerned with bolstering the constitutionality with a limitation of Title I to federally recognized
tribes in order to bring it within the reasoning of the Court in Morton v. Mancari, 471 U.S. 535
(1974). Id. For a discussion of the provisions of Title I, see Trope, supra note 6, at 386.
173. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The provisions dealing with prisoner's rights were
protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et. seq.
(1993). The Eagle feather provisions were protected by Presidential Directive of April 29, 1994,
which was signed in response to negotiations between the administration, the Coalition and the
Department of the Interior. Finally, the peyote issues were protected under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (Oct. 6,
1994). See Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 179-81.
174. S.REP.No. 411 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994).
175. Echo Hawk, supra note 21, at 182.
176. Id. S.2269 basically ignored the Justice Department's recommendations with regard to
the Establishment Clause concerns. This is because the Committee felt that the same concerns
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2269 was not meant to amend AIRFA, enacted in 1978, but further
17 7
the policies established in AIRFA.
As originally introduced, on July 1, 1994, the bill contained five
titles, exactly mirroring the titles of S. 1021.178 As amended, the bill:
(1) deleted the Title II peyote provisions; (2) addressed the religious
rights of individual Indians and their relation to tribal government;
and (3) contained additional refinements as submitted to the Commit179
tee by the Departments of the Interior and Justice.
The original bill only provided protection for sacred sites.'8 0
However, the amended bill extended protection to the cultural and
religious practices that are associated with those sites .'8 Additionally, the bill refined the definitions of sacred sites and adverse impacts
as well as the process of consultation.'8 z Title I, as amended, also provides several methods to address the potential for adverse impact. 183
Each step toward sacred site protection was achieved as a result of the
184
dialogue process and supported by the federal agencies implicated.
Title II, previously the peyote provision, 8 5 was amended to become the prisoners rights provision of the bill." 6 As amended, the
provision extends equal access rights to Native American prisoners
and accommodates Native American religious practices if they do not
conflict with "legitimate penological objectives."'"
Title III, entitled the Religious use of eagle feathers and other
animals and plants, provides statutory authorization for the Executive
would not be present if the bill were to protect culture as well as religious practice. Hence, the
change in the title of the bill. Id.
177. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Id. This increased protection was included at the urging of the Department of the Interior. Id.
182. Id. With respect to the consultation provisions, the agencies proposed a new term that
would define covered federal activities. Id.
183. Id. at 6. Consultation occurs between the agency and the affected party. Id. Memo-

randa agreements can be entered into which contain provision for access and actions of the
government that would desecrate or destroy that site. Id. The agency is authorized to establish
an administrative fact finding process and finally, there is to be federal court review as a last
resort to resolve problems. Id.
184. Id. Amendments were also included to address concerns of the development companies

that are potentially affected. Id.
185. See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
186. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994).

187. Id.
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Order signed on April 29, 1994.188 Again, the implicated agencies

were consulted and fully approved Title III as amended.'81 9
Title IV mirrors Title V of the original proposal. Title IV
"authoriz[ed] a cause of action in the federal district courts for violation of any" protected fights. 19 The provision also "sets forth the
burden of proof, production and persuasion on the parties to such an
action." 19 1

The Committee was advised by the DOJ that it is constitutionally
permissible for these protections to be established. 19 In Senate Bill
2269, the Committee found federal discrimination against Native
American traditional culture and religious practice did not follow the
neatly drawn "line" of "federally-recognized tribe status."'1 93 Thus,
provisions were included to provide protection to all native peoples.' 94
Included in its report, the Committee attached a letter from
James T. Blum, a staff member of the Congressional Budget Office,
regarding costs and budgetary considerations. 195 The findings of the
Congressional Budget Office were that no significant costs would result from implementing Senate Bill 2269.196 Additionally, the Standing Rules of the Senate required that an evaluation of regulatory and
paperwork impact be included."9 The Committee believed minimal
impacts would result "on regulatory or paperwork requirements."'198
188. Id. The Executive Order provides that "eagle feathers and other animal parts" be made
available to "tribes for religious and ceremonial use." Id. See supranote 160, and accompanying
text.
189. Id.
190. S.REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994). See supra note 161, and accompanying
text.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 8. However, the DOJ limited these protections to "federally-recognized tribes or
their designees." Id.
193. Id. The Committee recognized that the protection must be afforded to all cultural and
religious practices of "native peoples, including California Indians and Native Hawaiians." Id.
The Committee designed the definition section of the amended bill to comport with these distinctions and to insure the statute is "constitutionally permissible." Id.
194. Id.
195. Letter from James T. Blum to Senator Inouye, reprintedin S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 25 (1994).
196. Id. The CBO found that enactment would affect receipts and therefore a "pay-as-yougo procedure would apply." Id. The estimated effect on receipts was negligible. Id. Additional
costs would result from the provisions of Title I, the sacred sites protection. The provision would
establish criminal sanctions for intentional damage to sites. Id. The costs of implementing this
would be $100,000 and the revenue from fines is expected to be less than $500,000 per year. Id.
at 26.
197. S.REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1994).
198. Id.
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Further, the Committee received comments from the DOJ and
the DOI as to the views of the Administration on Senate Bill 2269.199
The DOJ noted at the outset that the Committee had their full support with regard to the goals of the bill.200 The DOJ noted, however,
that several constitutional and legal concerns remained with the
amended bill.2° '
The Establishment Clause concern was heightened by an intervening decision in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet.2°2 The DOJ concluded that to avoid the Establishment
Clause challenges, the legislation would have to rest on the special
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes.20 3
Merely adding the cultural protection provisions would not eliminate
the establishment concerns. 0 4
The DOJ had additional concerns about the change in the burden
of proof. 2°5 The DOJ recommended the burden be changed from the
"adverse impact" standard to the traditional "substantial burden. '20 6
Finally, the DOJ recommended miscellaneous changes to alleviate the
ambiguities that remained in the bill.20 7 The DOJ recommended
amendments to the bill to provide for these concerns.
199. Sheila F. Anthony, Views on S. 2269, reprinted in, S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess,
26 (1994).
200. Id.The DOJ noted that the protection of Indian religions was long overdue and their
goal was to develop legislation that would protect that religious freedom without the mire of
lengthy litigation. Id.
201. IL at 2Z The continued concerns of the Department of Justice included the Establishment Clause, a prohibition that was stated in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,244 (1982) (ruling
"the clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another."). Id.
202. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). Most important for the Justice Department was the concern with
Justice Souter's opinion for the plurality that found "although the delegation was to an ostensibly secular entity, 'the territory of the village of Kiryas Joel,'... in reality, the school district was
designed to include only" one religious sect. Anthony, supranote 199, at 27. Thus, the underlying group was religious and the delegation of authority therefore violated the Establishment
Clause. Ld.
203. Anthony, supranote 199, at 28. The recommendation was that the legislative protection
be limited to federally-recognized tribes and Alaska Native Villages. As stated supra, the Committee was unwilling to tailor the legislation so narrowly.
204. Id.at 29.
205. Id The standard in §§ 105 (c) and 501 (c) departs from the substantial burden standard
that is traditionally a part of First Amendment jurisprudence. Id.
206. Id. The DOJ recognized that this change in burden of proof was more than likely an
attempt to overturn the decision in Lyng, however they noted that § 105 (e) would already
achieve this result and therefore the change in burden of proof was unnecessary. Id.
207. Id. at 30. These changes included defining terms specifying what would happen if the
burden of proving alternatives was not met and the limitations of the judicial review provision.
Id.
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The Department of the Interior also recognized a number of concerns that required resolution before Administration approval could
be given to the bill.208 The DOI expressed its support for Senate Bill
2269, however recommended "deletion of culture" from the principal
provisions of the bill. 9
Further, the compelling interests test, as an enhancement of the
language and test in RFRA, was a concern for the DOI.2 10 In particular, the DOI noted that "the bill should track RFRA as closely as
possible" to avoid "new meanings and confusion" in the application
of RFRA.2 The DOI was also concerned with the bill's broad application to non-federally-recognized tribes.212 Coverage was thought to
be potentially problematic in that it broadened the "scope and manageability of the bill. '213 Finally, the DOI included a litany of other
issues to be resolved prior to its complete and total support of the
bill.

21 4

In August of 1994, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee forwarded Senate Bill 2269.215 In advancing this bill, the Committee
largely ignored the concerns of the Departments of Justice and Interior.216 The bill went the way most other legislative efforts to protect
sacred sites have gone. Thus, a need for legislative protection of Native American religious freedom, in particular protection of sacred
sites, remains.217
C. The Future - An Executive Order?
At the present time, Native American religious freedom is still in
a state of peril. "Native groups are [however], requesting an Executive Order to establish notice and consultation procedur[es] ... and
208. Ada E. Deer, Response to Request for Views, reprintedin S. REP. No. 411,103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 31 (1994).

209. Id. at 32. The DOI felt that the addition of culture, to alleviate constitutional problems,
would be ineffective and would greatly broaden the scope of the bill. Id. Therefore the agency
recommended the deletion of culture in order to forestall potential problems. Id
210. Id.
211. Id. at 33. The arguments of the DOI closely resemble the concerns of the DOJ with
respect to the review standard and the compelling interest test.
212. Id. at 34.
213. Id. at 35. The Department of Interior felt that reliance on the federal recognition requirement would satisfy the concerns of constitutionality of the scope of the bill and its manageability. Id.
214. Id. at 35-36.
215. Echo-Hawk, supranote 21, at 182. However, due to opposition from developers, action
on the measure has been greatly hindered. Id.
216. Id. at 182.
217. Id. at 183.
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' The proposed
may, [perhaps, request] a short cause of action bill."218
Executive Order would create administrative solutions to the problem
of protecting sacred sites. 219 A version of the Executive Order from
the National Council on American Indians and the Departments of
Interior and Justice would, first, create a process for sacred site protection agreements between tribes and agencies.2 0 Next, it would require agencies to notify tribes when dealing with listed sacred sites.2 1
Finally, it would require agencies to promulgate regulations to protect
the sites and provide access. 22
The vitality of the Executive Order remains in question. However, with the present composition of Congress the prospects for gaining such protection there are dismal.' 3 The projections for the 104th
Congress are quite grim even in the eyes of the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee. z 4 At this time, the members of the Committee have felt
that the atmosphere is not ripe for reintroduction of a sacred site pro225
tection bill.
The Committee, however, fully supports the proposed Executive
Order and believes that it would acknowledge the Department of Interior's commitment to careful management. 6 Under the Executive
Order, the guidelines set forth by the Bureau of Land Management
would prioritize sacred sites.' 7 However, there is the unfortunate realization that nothing occurs in a vacuum and, therefore, nothing
would prohibit an action merely upon showing an impact on a sacred
site.228
V.

CONCLUSION

The future for Native American religious freedom remains unclear. The current status of the law with regard to sacred sites remains
the Supreme Court's holding in Lyng. Under post-Lyng analysis it is
218. Id. At the writing of this article, the Executive Order, proposed to the tribes at the
April 28, 1995 meeting with the President, remains in the Executive Office. It is unclear what
has occurred and whether the Order will meet the satisfaction of the Native groups.
219. Craig Alexander, Address at Federal Bar Association, Indian Law Conference (Apr. 7,
1995).
220. ld.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Echo-Hawk, supra note 21, at 183.
224. Diane Humetewa, Address at Federal Bar Association, Indian Law Conference (Apr. 7,
1995).
225. lId.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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doubtful whether an Indian claimant could ever meet the burden of
proving that the government action constitutes a prohibition of a religious practice rather than a lack of accommodation. 229
Native Americans are, therefore, left to the small protection afforded under AIRFA and RFRA until some other legislation or reform manifests itself. Even if protection were to come in the form of a
statute or an Executive Order one problem remains. There is an underlying lack of understanding of Native American religious practice
that will always be predominate. The burden of ignorance and intolerance may well be greater than any governmental constraint.
While ignorance may remain, "[t]he framers of the Constitution
did not envision a nation where all would know and understand each
other's religious affiliations, but a nation where tolerance predominates."' 0 Thus, there must be continued efforts to fill the immense
void that remains in understanding and protecting Native American
religious freedom.
Rayanne . Griffin

229. Carson, supra note 100, at 192.
230. Falcone, supra note 3, at 575.
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